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RECENT DECISIONS
system.4 It is none the less reasonable to assume that a tax based
upon a graduated charge upon such proportion of the outstanding
capital stock, as the gross receipts of the Texas business bear to the
total gross receipts from its entire business, as here, is justified.5 The
state is due some consideration for the measure of protection it af-
fords the corporation, especially since the privilege granted enables the
corporation to successfully exploit the business possibilities within the
state. Then, too, the volume of property outside the state may cause
intrastate property to fluctuate at random. Financial power, no mat-
ter where located, if inherent in the assets, may be applied at any
point determined by the managers of the corporation. For this rea-
son, it has been held that an entrance fee may be properly measured
by capital wherever located.0 In Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company v.
Grosjean,7 where the tax was graduated on the number of chain
stores under the same management, whether in the same state or not,
the Court said: "The law rates the privilege enjoyed in Louisiana
according to the nature and extent of that privilege in the light of
the advantages, the capacity, and the competitive ability of the chain
stores in Louisiana considered not by themselves, as if they consti-
tuted the whole organization, but in their setting as integral parts of
a much larger organization." 8 This same rule applies to the case in
question.
Foreign corporations are entitled to protection under the "due
process" and "equal protection" clauses of the Federal Constitution.9
This protection does not, however, prohibit the states from enacting
tax laws aimed at foreign corporations doing business within the
state itself. It is sometimes difficult to determine just what consti-
tutes "interstate commerce". Very thin, indeed, is the line separating
the power of the state from the exclusive power of Congress in this
regard. Consequently, the particular facts of each case will be the
determining factor in reaching the ultimate decision.
E. R. D.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-REQuIRE-
MENT BY MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE OF PERMIT TO CANVASS.-Peti-
tioner, Clara Schneider, is a member of the Watch Tower Bible and
Tract Society and is known as one of "Jehovah's Witnesses". She
4 People of the State of New York v. Gamble Latrobe, Jr., et al., 279 U. S.
421, 49 Sup. Ct. 377 (1929).
See note 1, supra.
6 Atlantic Refining Co. v. Virginia, 302 U. S. 22, 58 Sup. Ct. 75 (1937).
7301 U. S. 412, 57 Sup. Ct. 772 (1937).8 Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U. S. 412, 425, 57 Sup. Ct.
772 (1937).
9 Quaker City Cab Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389,
400, 48 Sup. Ct. 553 (1928).
1940 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
was convicted in the Town of Irvington for canvassing with pamphlets
from door to door without a permit as required by a municipal ordi-
nance.' Her refusal to apply for a permit was justified in her mind
by her belief that to do so would be an act of disobedience and a
violation of a command of the Almighty God. On appeal from con-
viction, she claimed that the municipal ordinance was a direct abridge-
ment of the freedom of the press guaranteed by the Federal Consti-
tution.2 The Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld the convictions
and this decision was affirmed by the Court of Errors and Appeals. 4
Upon certiorari 5 to the United States Supreme Court, held, one judge
dissenting, the ordinance is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Schneider v. State of New Jersey, 308 U. S. 147, 60
Sup. Ct. 146 (1939).
A municipality's right to pass laws or ordinances designed to
protect the public from fraudulent solicitation 6 or to maintain sani-
tary conditions 7 is limited only by the guarantees existing in the
Federal Constitution and its amendments.8 The New Jersey courts
in this case attempted to justify the ordinance on the theory that it
was a valid exercise of the police power of the city as its purpose
was the protection of the citizens from false appeals in the name of
charity. They denied the applicability of the decision of Lovell v.
City of Griffin 9 cited by the petitioner's counsel, by pointing out that
in that case the ordinance was aimed at all types of distribution of
any literature at any time and in any place without written permis-
sion from the city manager, while in the present ordinance the object
of control was only door-to-door canvassing.
The Supreme Court declared this distinction invalid and ruled
that the Lovell case 10 was in point and cited another case 11 in which
the ordinance provided for previous administration or censorship of
the exercise of the right of free speech and assembly in appropriate
public places. The ordinance now under discussion bans all unli-
censed communication of ideas from door to door. Any such attempt
I "No person except as in this ordinance provided shall canvass, solicit,
distribute circulars or other matter, or call from house to house in the Town of
Irvington without first having reported to and received a written permit from
the chief of police or officer in charge of Police Headquarters."
2 "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States." U. S. CoxsT. Amend. XIV,
§ 1. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 56 Sup. Ct. 440 (1936);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 45 Sup. Ct. 625 (1925).
3 120 N. J. L. 460, 200 Ati. 799 (1938).
4121 N. J. L. 542, 3 A. (2d) 609 (1939).
5 Petition granted, 306 U. S. 628, 59 Sup. Ct. 774 (1939).
6 See Schneider v. State of New Jersey, 308 U. S. 147, 60 Sup. Ct. 146, 147,
148 (1939).
7 See Snyder v. City of Milwaukee, 306 U. S. 629, 59 Sup. Ct. 789 (1939);
Young v. People of State of California, 306 U. S. 628, 59 Sup. Ct. 775 (1939).8 U. S. CoNsT. Amend. XIV, § 1.
9 303 U. S. 444, 58 Sup. Ct. 668 (1938).
10 Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 58 Sup. Ct. 668 (1938).
11 C.I.O. v. Hague, 307 U. S. 496, 59 Sup. Ct. 954 (1939).
[ VOL. 14
RECENT DECISIONS
to disseminate ideas could only be done after a submission to review
and on obtaining of the approval of the police in the municipality.
In this manner, a. direct censorship might be imposed. The power of
the city to regulate canvassing is not denied by this decision. The
court merely declares that any attempt to control in the manner here-
in utilized will render the ordinance void and the courts will refuse
to convict for a violation. The desire on the part of the municipality
to protect its citizens *from fraudulent appeals which might be made
in the name of charity is in keeping with its function as a governing
body and may be exercised in regard to regulation of hours and other
details. But it cannot attempt to achieve this end by centering con-
trol in its own hands, of the ideas to be spread, even if this control
is limited to one type of distribution-in this case canvassing, proven
by our own history to be one of the most effective methods.
S. K.
CONTRACT MADE IN VIOLATION OF STATUTE-VALIDITY OF
CONTRACT AFTER REPEAL OF PROHIBITORY PROVISION-EIGHTEENTH
AMENDMENT-FEDERAL RULE-NEW YORK RULE.-While the Pro-
hibition Amendment was in effect 1 defendant was engaged in the
lawful manufacture of near beer. It had been deprived of its license
for violating a statute passed pursuant to the Amendment. Plaintiff,
a resident of Baltimore, operated the Camden Products Co. of New
Jersey, which was engaged in the preparation of malt syrup, one of
the essential ingredients in the brewing of beer. He had, with knowl-
edge that defendant had lost its license, sold and delivered syrup to
the latter to enable it to continue the manufacture of beer in violation
of the statute. After the repeal of this statute and the Prohibition
Amendment,2 he brought an action in the District Court of the United
States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, for the purpose of
recovering the price of the malt syrup previously sold and delivered
to the defendant. Judgment was in favor of the latter and plaintiff
appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals. Held, judgment affirmed.
Where a contract is made in violation of a statute which is subse-
quently repealed, and the parties are in pari delicto, the invalidity of
the original contract will not be changed. Fitzsimons v. Eagle Brew-
ing Co., 107 F. (2d) 712 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
Under the federal and majority rule a contract made in violation
of a statutory provision is considered void ab initio as being based on
an illegal consideration, and the removal of the prohibitory statute
1U. S. CoNsT. Amend. XVIII; 41 STAT. 307, 318 (1919), 27 U. S. C. A.
§§4, 58 (1925).
2 U. S. CoNsT. Amend. XXI, repealing Amend. XVIII.
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